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A Duty to Rescue: The Good, the Bad and the
Indifferent-the Bystander's Dilemma
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the nation was shocked as the details of Catherine "Kitty"
Genovese's murder were disseminated through news accounts. Ms.
Genovese was stabbed to death in her middle-class neighborhood in
Queens, New York.' The attack lasted thirty-five minutes while her
neighbors did nothing and watched from the safety of their apart-
ments. The assailant caught Ms. Genovese on her way home from
work as she walked from a parking lot toward her apartment build-
ing at about 3:20 A.M. The assailant stabbed her, then fled when she
screamed for help. When her screams went unanswered, he returned
to strike again. After the second assault, he got into his car and
drove away while Ms. Genovese crawled to her apartment doorway.
Amazingly, the killer came back a third time and repeated his attack.
This time he successfully killed her. "The first call to police was not
made until 3:50 A.M. The man who finally called said he waited be-
cause he 'didn't want to get involved.' "2
Ms. Genovese was as much the victim of her neighbors' passivity as
her assailant's viciousness. The assault is one of the more notorious
in a long line of similar incidents. 3 Kitty Genovese's neighbors did
not violate any law or render themselves legally liable by their inac-
tion on that fateful night. They were legally unreproachable.4
The common law does not recognize a duty to aid another in dis-
tress.5 For many years, the imposition of such a duty has been the
1. Kiesel, Who Saw This Happen?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1208 (1983). "Genovese's death
became for many the symbol for a society that had somehow lost its sense of human-
ity." Id. at 1208.
2. Id. Thirty-eight people watched from their houses without calling the police.
See generally A. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES (1964).
3. See, e.g., Clendinen, Barroom Rape Shames Town of Proud Heritage, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 17, 1983, § A, at 16, col. 1. A young woman was raped repeatedly by a
group of men in a bar while patrons looked on and cheered.
4. See Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1209.
5. See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1897). This case exempli-
fies the view that there is no general duty to rescue. Consider the court's remarks:
Actionable negligence is the neglect of a legal duty. The defendants are not
liable unless they owed to the plaintiff a legal duty which they neglected to
perform. With purely moral obligations the law does not deal .... Suppose
A, standing close by a railroad, sees a two-year-old babe on the track and a car
topic of heated debate among legal scholars, legislators, philosophers
and the public.6 Recently, the common law has come under increas-
ingly critical review. Consequently, several states have enacted a
statutory duty to aid,7 however, the fact remains that in most states
the law still refuses to recognize such a duty.8
The question arises as to why there has been such slow progress by
society, the legislature, and the judiciary in bringing about a change
in the law, in light of the immeasurable price such a refusal to aid
exacts from society. To a large extent, the answer lies in the histori-
cal origin of the common law rule itself and in the perceived limita-
tions on the power of the courts to impose liability for failure to act.9
However, the justifications that originally supported the rule may no
longer be valid.1o Society has changed, and so has its problems and
needs. The law must also change in order to address those needs.
As previously mentioned, the duty to rescue has been the subject
of innumerable legal articles." Therefore, this article is an attempt
to examine the status of the law from a somewhat different perspec-
tive. The issue of a bystander's duty to rescue touches upon three
major disciplines: philosophy, psychology, and law.12 To date, in
studying the duty to rescue issue, these disciplines have been isolated
from each other.13 However, each significantly impacts on this issue
and each should be considered in determining whether a change in
the law is advisable.14 This comment will consider all three
disciplines.
approaching. He can easily rescue the child with entire safety to himself, and
the instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, per-
haps, justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster, but he is not lia-
ble in damages for the child's injury, or indictable under the statute for its
death.
Id. at 260, 44 A. at 810. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 340
(4th ed. 1971); Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1980).
6. See generally Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908); Bohlen, The
Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908);
Weinrib, supra note 5; Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An
Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV.
252 (1983).
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-
3.1 (Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
8. See Comment, The Duty to Rescue in California: A Legislative Solution?, 15
PAC. L.J. 1261, 1261 (1984); Comment, Duty to Aid the Endangered Act: The Impact
and Potential of the Vermont Approach, 7 VT. L. REV. 143, 143-44 (1982).
9. It was commonly believed that legal liability could only be enforced in cases
involving misfeasance (where there existed the doing or causing of harm).
10. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966); Linden,
Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MOD. L. REV. 241 (1971); Weinrib, supra note 5;
Comment, supra note 6.
12. L. SHELEFF, THE BYSTANDER 6 (1978).
13. Id.
14. Id. (The three disciplines are considered in the study of victomology.)
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This article will first discuss the common law rule concerning duty
to aid, its origin, how it has evolved, and whether it needs changing.
Second, the erosion of the common law rule through judicial excep-
tions will be explored. Have the judicial exceptions swallowed the
rule? How are the exceptions justified when a public duty to rescue
cannot be? Third, what has psychological research uncovered in the
area referred to as "crowd inertia?" What are the implications of this
research? Finally, the recent legislative enactments imposing a public
duty to aid will be discussed and compared.
II. THE COMMON LAW RULE
The common law does not recognize a duty to aid a stranger in dis-
tress even though the danger may be great and the inconvenience to
the potential rescuer only slight.15 If A sees B, a blind man, about to
step into the street in the path of an approaching automobile, A may
watch and do nothing even if he could easily warn B of the danger.
A is under no duty to prevent B from coming to harm.16 The law
will not hold A liable for any injuries suffered by B that A could
have avoided.
Why, in light of the extreme consequences that may result, has the
law refused to recognize such a duty? The answer, to a large extent,
lies in the historical origins of the common law rule.17 The common
law embodies the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.18
Misfeasance is the causing of harm, while nonfeasance is merely al-
lowing harm to take place through inaction.19 The common law has
long incorporated the general principle that inaction or nonfeasance,
will not give rise to legal liability.20
Traditionally courts were not viewed as having the power to im-
pose liability for failure to act.2 ' Liability was found to exist only
when an individual in some way caused harm to another. 22 Imposing
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 340-41.
16. L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 102-03.
17. For a general background of the legal duty to rescue in Anglo-American law,
see THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 11.
18. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 338-50; Bohlen, supra note 6, at 219.
19. See Bohlen, supra note 6, at 219. See also T. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
OF MORALITY 25 (1983) for examples of these concepts.
20. See T. GREY, supra note 19, at 26. This notion was predicated on the theory
that nonfeasance left the plaintiff in no worse position than he was in previously. It is
also attributable to the idea that individual liberty is violated when someone is forced
to prevent harm that he has not caused. Id.
21. See, e.g., Buch, 69 N.H. at 260, 44 A. at 810.
22. Id.
a legal duty to rescue was not considered to be enforceable because it
involved an omission to act. The courts did not consider nonfeasance
to amount to causation.23
A. The Philosophical Basis for the Common Law Misfeasance-
Nonfeasance Distinction
The misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction reflected the attitudes
and beliefs of common law courts regarding the justifiable scope of
the law.24 These attitudes and beliefs remain prevalent in Anglo-
American law.25 Incorporated into the law are certain principles and
doctrines espoused by significant philosophers. One philosopher in
particular appears to have been especially influential. John Stuart
Mill, in his essay, On Liberty, published in 1859, advocated a philoso-
phy which focused on individual liberty and the idea that individual
freedom, unrestrained by government intervention, is essential for
the progress and well-being of society.26
Mill's theory promotes a liberty of individual tastes and pursuits,
where each person is free to pursue his interests without impediment
from others, no matter how foolish they may think he is, provided he
does not put others at risk or subject them to harm in any way.27 Im-
plicit in this theory is opposition to any attempt by the law to coer-
cively impose upon individuals any communal standard of morality.28
Mill considered government's attempt to legislate morality an illegiti-
mate exercise of power. In short, Mill's view is that an individual's
private morality is "not the law's business." 29
Analyzing the duty to rescue, the controversy focuses not on
whether there is a moral obligation to rescue, but whether the law
23. Id.
24. See Bohlen, supra note 6, at 219-21.
25. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). "The mere fact that
Bigan saw Yania in a position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal,
although a moral, obligation to go to his rescue unless Bigan was legally responsible, in
whole or in part, for placing Yania in the perilous position." Id. at 321-22, 155 A.2d at
346.
26. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13-17 (C. Shields ed. 1956). See also T. GREY, supra
note 19, at 9.
27. See T. GREY, supra note 19, at 3.
28. Id. at 9.
29. T. GREY, supra note 19, at 4. See also Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan.
649, 72 P. 281 (1930). The court drew a clear distinction between moral and legal
obligations.
With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is the omis-
sion or negligent discharge of legal duties only which come within the sphere
of judicial cognizance. For withholding relief from the suffering, for failure to
respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment of
brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in the laws of men,
but in that higher law, the violation of which is condemned by the voice of
conscience, whose sentence of punishment for the recreant is swift and sure.
Id. at 653, 72 P. at 282.
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can enforce such an obligation.3 0 Proponents of Mill's view argue
that courts do not have the authority to direct people as to their con-
science. The law's role is limited to preventing people from harming
one another and may not force them to confer benefits upon each
other.a1
Critics of Mill's view claim that society must and frequently does
impose considerable limitations upon the rights and activities of its
members, a necessity for its very survival.32 Activities such as taxa-
tion and the military draft are accepted as legitimate exercises of gov-
ernment authority. 33 In certain situations, it is appropriate, even
necessary, for the law to adopt certain standards of moral behavior.
Mill's theory, commonly referred to by his critics as "excessive in-
dividualism," 34 is found to be seriously lacking in its refusal to recog-
nize that there are minimum moral requirements that must be
maintained in order for a society to function.3 5 Indeed, the health
and welfare of a society is directly dependent upon adherence of the
law to a binding moral code.36 Individualism, it is argued, has two
components: "The value of the individual in our society is reflected
not only in respect for his rights, but in concern for his well-being." 37
How desirable is a philosophy based on individualism that proclaims
an individual's liberty and rights, but negates the value of his life?
Lon Fuller, in his work The Morality of Law, posits that there are
actually two moralities, the morality of aspiration and the morality of
duty. The morality of aspiration promotes the affirmative effort to
30. See, e.g., Buch, 69 N.H. at 260, 44 A. at 810.
31. Ames, supra note 6, at 112.
32. L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 112.
33. Id.
34. T. GREY, supra note 19, at 6. Excessive individualism refers to the over-em-
phasis placed on the individual in Mill's philosophy. The individual reigns supreme
and the community is secondary. This unbridled individualism has been criticized as
being out of step with the notion of a modern society. Id.
35. See L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 174. See also T. GREY, supra note 19, at 4-5.
This same debate was exemplified in the famous Hart-Devlin debate which began in
England circa 1958. The Wolfenden Committee had been established in England in or-
der to examine the law involving homosexuality and prostitution. The Committee rec-
ommended repeal of the law which punished consenting adults for homosexual acts.
Lord Devlin spoke out against the conclusions of the Wolfenden Committee, arguing
that moral beliefs must be subject to legal enforcement. In answer to Lord Devlin, the
British legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart became involved in the dispute, advocating a re-
vised version of Mill's principle. T. GREY, supra note 19, at 4-5.
36. See id. Lord Devlin made this argument in the debate. Id.
37. Comment, Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists and the
Duty to Rescue, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 529, 542 (1976).
perfection and excellence in all human endeavors. 38 This type of mo-
rality cannot be encompassed in a legal system. However, the moral-
ity of duty is the minimum moral requirement necessary for a
healthy, working society that must be included within its laws.3 9
One of the most telling distinctions between Anglo-American law
and the civil law of continental Europe is their respective treatments
of the duty to rescue.40 Almost all European countries have enacted
statutes enforcing a general duty to rescue and these statutes have
proved to be workable.41 The statutes are usually incorporated
within the criminal code, which encompasses penalties consisting of
both fines and prison sentences for failure to take action. 42 Article 63
of the French Penal Code provides, "[w]hoever is able to prevent by
his immediate action, without risk to himself or others, the commis-
sion of a serious crime or offense against the person, and voluntarily
neglects to do so shall be liable."43 Criminal sanctions may be im-
posed whether or not harm resulted from the failure to rescue and
the penalty may be imprisonment for up to five years.4 4 Similar pro-
visions imposing criminal liability for failing to come to the aid of an-
other in distress have been enacted in Turkey, Portugal, Italy,
Norway, Poland, Denmark and Rumania. 45
The 1983 multiple rape in a New Bedford, Massachusetts tavern46
is reminiscent of an earlier case which involved British soldiers sta-
tioned in Germany.47 They were present while a woman was gang
raped and did nothing to aid her. Charges were brought against them
for aiding and abetting. Although originally convicted, they were
38. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). Fuller's argument is that the con-
tending viewpoints are flawed because they fail to define the meaning of morality. Id.
at 3-4.
39. See id. at 5-6. "Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human
achievement, the morality of duty starts at the bottom. It lays down the basic rules
without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered society
directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark." Id,
40. See Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD SA-
MARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 11, at 91-134; Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Com-
parative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631, 635-40 (1952).
41. See Rudzinski, supra note 40, at 91-92. See also Comment, supra note 37, at
529 (contrasting the American approach with the Czechoslovakian and Russian ap-
proaches). The 1964 Czechoslovak Civil Code imposes a duty to prevent "injury to
health and damage to property or undue enrichment to the detriment of society of in-
dividuals." T. GREY, supra note 19, at 173 (quoting the Czechoslovakian Civil Code).
42. See Rudzinski, supra note 40, at 108-10; L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 109.
43. L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 108 (quoting Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67
YALE L.J. 590, 632 (1958)).
44. Rudzinski, supra note 40, at 108-10.
45. See Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans. A Comparative Survey of Crimi-
nal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 630, 632 (1966).
46. Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208.
47. R. V. Clarkson, [1971] 3 All E.R. 344. See also L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at
107.
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later found not guilty on appeal precisely because they had remained
totally impassive and had in no way attempted to intervene. Had
they been subject to German law instead of British law, they would
most likely have been convicted under Article 330c of the German
Criminal Code for failure to rescue.48 This case illustrates what has
commonly been said regarding the lack of duty to rescue in Anglo-
American law, it "reflects a peculiarly callous and selfish individual-
ism" prevalent in English-speaking countries.4 9
The courts have created a rather perverse situation by following
the common law rule of no duty to rescue. A potential rescuer who
stops and attempts to render aid must be cautious. If he in any way
is negligent or exacerbates a victim's injuries, a court may find him
liable to the victim.50 This is true even if the injuries are minor as
compared to the harm that might have resulted had rescuer walked
away. The potential rescuer who does not lift a finger to help has
nothing to worry about. The law will absolve him of his
callousness.51
The common law has not intended to discourage such Good Samar-
itan behavior although this has often been the result.52 The some-
times incredulous results of the rule have been viewed as the
inevitable, albeit ignoble, consequences paid to protect individual lib-
48. L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 107. Article 330c of the German Criminal Code
reads as translated:
Anybody who does not render aid in an accident or common danger or in an
emergency situation, although aid is needed and under the circumstances can
be expected of him, especially if he would not subject himself thereby to any
considerable danger, or if he would not thereby violate other important du-
ties, shall be punished by imprisonment not to exceed one year or a fine.
Feldbrugge, supra note 45, at 655 (citing Germany, Crim. Code, Art. 330c (1953)).
49. T. GREY, supra note 19, at 168 (quoting Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Al-
truistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REV. 817, 1073 (1961)).
50. See Silva v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 775, 97 P.2d 798, 804
(1939). If an individual attempts a rescue, the law construes it as an assumption of
duty and imposes liability for any negligence on the rescuer's part. Id.
51. Dean Prosser, in criticism of the common law rule, wrote:
The law has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation of common
decency and common humanity, to come to the aid of another human being
who is in danger, even though the outcome is to cost him his life. Some of the
decisions have been shocking in the extreme. The expert swimmer ... who
sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do anything at all
about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette and watch the man
drown ....
W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 340. The example given is based on the facts of a real
case. See Osterland v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928).
52. T. GREY, supra note 19, at 29.
393
erty.5 3 Fundamental to the courts' continued allegiance to the rule is
the belief that the spirit of individualism indirectly benefits society as
a whole. As each individual furthers his own welfare, society inevita-
bly reaps some of the benefits.54
There is a growing concern that the increasing mobility of society
has led to the weakening of community bonds and social pressures to
come to the aid of another in distress.55 Most people, as in Kitty
Genovese's case, do not want to get involved. Commentators have ar-
gued that American society as a whole needs to become more con-
cerned about a neighbor's welfare.56
Advocates of a statutory duty to rescue take issue with Mill's pro-
nouncement against legislating morality. They argue that the law, it-
self, is society's pronouncement of right and wrong and, as such, is in
essence a moral determination.57 As times change and morals change
so should the law. The law embodies the priorities and values of a
society.58 Society must, in the final analysis, decide whether it is
willing to use the resources at its disposal to cultivate prosocial be-
havior in the form of benevolence towards and assumption of respon-
sibility for one's neighbor.59
B. The Erosion of the Common Law Rule
An action for negligence will lie only if the defendant owed a rec-
ognized legal duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care and
failed to do so. 60 Legal duties are continuously being created by the
courts.61 As Dean Prosser wrote, "Changing social conditions lead
constantly to the recognition of new duties." 62 The essential question
is "whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection
53. Id.
54. See L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 112.
55. See Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551
P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
56. See Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 314
(1983). See also Comment, The Duty to Rescue in California: A Legislative Solution,
15 PAC. L.J. 1261, 1281 (1984); Note, Creation of a Duty Absent A Special Relationship
- Legal Duty Based on Moral Obligation - Soldano v. O'Daniels, 6 WHITTIER L. REV.
605, 610-11 (1984).
57. See The Queen v. Instan, [1893] 1 Q.B. 450 (Lord Coleridge, C.J.). Not "every
moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral obli-
gation." Id. at 453.
58. "The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life." Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
59. See generally L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 185.
60. See McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 480-81, 403 A.2d 500, 507 (1979).
61. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
62. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 327. Dean Prosser has stated "that 'duty' is
not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protec-
tion." Id. at 325-26.
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against the defendant's conduct."63
The legislature and the judiciary have recognized a need for protec-
tion for the victim in the duty to rescue area. The legislatures of a
number of states have created statutory duties to aid a stranger in
certain scenarios. Many states require that a driver involved in an
automobile accident, regardless of fault, must stop and render assist-
ance to anyone that is injured.64 In addition, the egregious conse-
quences often resulting from the application of the common law rule
have led the courts to develop certain exceptions which justify the
imposition of a duty to aid. These exceptions are predicated on the
existence of a special relationship between the parties.65
At early common law, the only special relationships falling into the
exception to the rule were common carrier to passenger, innkeeper
to guest, and shipmaster to seaman.6 6 As discussed earlier, the com-
mon law rule of no duty to act was premised upon the traditional
misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction.67 The recognition of a special
relationship exception created a duty in the absence of misfeasance,
or lack of causation. 68
Commentators, in an effort to justify the existence of the special
relationship exceptions, speculate that it is the rescuer's ability to
rescue coupled with the victim's dependency on the rescuer that
gives rise to the duty.69 There is usually some economic benefit flow-
63. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964).
64. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 20003 (West 1971), amended by CAL. VEH. CODE.
§ 20003(b) (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 95 1/2, § 11-403 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985).
65. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 333 U.S. 821, 823
(1948) (employer-employee); Devlin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 882, 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (proprietor-customer); Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696,
308 N.E.2d 467 (1974) (property owner-trespasser); Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281,
287, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1976) (companion-companion).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 55 (8th ed. 1973).
67. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 338.
68. See Comment, supra note 6, at 263. Consider:
A. omits to give Z. food, and by that omission voluntarily causes Z.'s death. Is
this murder? Under [the applicable] rule it is murder if A. was Z.'s gaoler,
directed by law to furnish Z. with food. It is murder if Z. was the infant child
of A., and had, therefore, a legal right to sustenance, which right a Civil Court
would enforce against A. It is murder if Z. was a bedridden invalid, and A. a
nurse hired to feed Z .... It is not murder if Z. is a beggar, who has no
other claim on A. than that of humanity.
T. GREY, supra note 19, at 161.
69. Comment, supra note 6, at 263-66; see also M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT
LAW, POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 69 (1977). There are four types of rescue. First, a
person may rescue another by physically intervening to help. Second, a person can
ing between the parties. The plaintiff initially depends on the res-
cuer for things other than safety.70 For example, the plaintiff
depends on the common carrier for transportation or on the inn-
keeper for room and board. A relationship thus existed before the
emergency or need to rescue arose. In such a situation, the defend-
ant is thought to hold some power or control over the plaintiff since
"the defendant has the opportunity to take certain precautions to de-
crease the probability that harm will come to the plaintiff."71
The courts have expanded the list of special relationships to in-
clude the following: employer to employee, 72 shopkeeper to cus-
tomer,73 host to guest,74 jailer to prisoner,7 5 school to student,76 and
companion to companion.7 7 The expansion has caused problems.78
The general rule has been almost completely consumed by the bur-
geoning number of exceptions. 79 The relationship between the gen-
eral rule and its exceptions is inherently at odds-the general rule
requires misfeasance, the exceptions do not.8 0
The rationale originally espoused to justify the early exceptions is
not applicable to more recent court holdings.81 The inconsistent man-
ner in which the exceptions have been adopted has led to considera-
ble confusion concerning which special relationships give rise to a
duty and whether a particular relationship fits within a recognized
exception.82
In People v. Beardsley,83 the court held that the relationship be-
tween a man and his lover was not sufficient to justify imposing a
legal duty to aid. The defendant and his lover had been together for
prevent an injury by making his property safe. Third, a person may save another
through a warning. And finally, one may rescue another by calling the appropriate au-
thorities. Comment, supra note 6, at 266 n.72.
70. Comment, supra note 6, at 265.
71. Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implications of Research on Altruism,
55 IND. L.J. 551, 553 (1980).
72. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 333 U.S. 821 (1948); Ca-
rey v. Davis, 190 Iowa 720, 180 N.W. 889 (1921).
73. See, e.g., Connelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A.2d 125 (1944);
Larkin v. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 P. 686 (1905).
74. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 830
(1947).
75. See, e.g., Farmer v. State, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955); O'Dell v. Goodsell,
149 Neb. 261, 30 N.W.2d 906 (1948).
76. See, e.g., Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40 Cal. 2d 207, 253
P.2d 1 (1953).
77. See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976).
78. See Comment, supra note 6, at 262, 262 n.52.
79. Weinrib, supra note 6, at 248.
80. Id.
81. See Note, supra note 71, at 553.
82. Comment, Taking Notice of Good Samaritan and Duty to Rescue Laws, 11 J.
CONTEMP. L. 219, 220 (1984); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 340-42.
83. 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
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several days, drinking and carousing while the defendant's wife was
out of town.8 4 While intoxicated, the lover imbibed morphine and
consequently fell into a stupor.8 5 The defendant never summoned
medical attention and the next day the woman died.86 The court
held that the defendant was not criminally liable because no special
relationship was found to have existed between the defendant and
the decedent.8 7
Likewise, in Yania v. Bigan,8 8 the defendant enticed a business in-
vitee to jump into a trench filled with about ten feet of water.
Although the decedent yelled for help, he was ignored by the defend-
ant.8 9 The court held that the defendant was not liable due to the
absence of a special relationship.90
However, in the case of Farwell v. Keaton,91 the court found a spe-
cial relationship. Two companions, Siegrist and Farwell, went out for
the evening. During the course of the night, they got into a disagree-
ment with some other boys and a fight ensued.92 Siegrist escaped,
but Farwell suffered a severe beating. 93 Siegrist later went back to
find Farwell and took him home.94 Farwell was asleep in the back
seat of the car and Siegrist could not awaken him, so Siegrist went
home.95 The next morning, Farwell's grandparents discovered him
in the car and took him to the hospital, where he died three days
later.96 Farwell's father brought a wongful death action against
Siegrist.
84. Id. at 208, 113 N.W. at 1129.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 209, 113 N.W. at 1131. The Beardsley court held that although the de-
fendant's inaction was surely questionable, no legal duty to act existed simply because
the two were alone together. The court did say a manslaughter verdict could have
been sustained if the lover was the defendant's wife. Id. at 208, 113 N.W. at 1129.
88. 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959).
89. Id. at 319, 155 A.2d at 344.
90. Id. at 322, 155 A.2d at 346.
91. 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976).
92. Id. at 283, 240 N.W.2d at 219. It appears that Farwell and Siegrist met two girls
and attempted to engage them in conversation. They followed the girls into a restau-
rant, and the girls complained to their friends that they were being followed. As a re-
sult, six boys chased both Farwell and Siegrist out of the restaurant, and the fight
ensued. Id
93. Id.
94. Id. Siegrist found Farwell underneath a car. Farwell appeared to be all right,
so the boys drove around for another two hours and Farwell went to sleep in the back
seat of the car. Id.
95. Id. at 285, 240 N.W.2d at 219.
96. Id. Farwell died of an epidural hematoma. Id.
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that Siegrist had an affirma-
tive duty to aid Farwell.97 As one ground, the court invoked the doc-
trine that once a person commences a rescue, he or she must then act
reasonably. It was reasoned that Siegrist had commenced a rescue
when he picked Farwell up, and the subsequent abandonment of him
in the car was negligent.9 8 The court went on to rule that, in any
event, Siegrist had a duty to rescue Farwell based on their association
that evening.99 They "were companions engaged in a common under-
taking; there was a special relationship" between them. 0 0 The court,
however, failed to explain why this relationship was special.
Given the above-mentioned decisions, why would friends owe a
duty to each other but not lovers to each other? The distinction is
neither explained nor clear. Not only are the general rule and its ex-
ceptions at odds, but the exceptions themselves are inconsistent. The
courts, in total contradiction to the rule, have gone even further and
found a duty to aid even where no special relationship exists.1 01
In a recent holding, a California appellate court found an affirma-
tive duty to aid in the absence of a special relationship. 0 2 The court
held that during business hours a business establishment had a duty
to allow a Good Samaritan the use of its phone in an emergency. 0 3
The plaintiff in that case instituted an action for wrongful death af-
ter his father was shot and killed in a bar. The defendant was the
owner of a restaurant across the street. Apparently, prior to the
shooting, a patron of the bar had come to the restaurant to call the
police. The restaurant employee had refused to make the call or al-
low the patron access to the phone.10 4 The court imposed liability on
the restaurant owner for negligent interference with a third person
attempting to render aid.105 The court concluded that the employee
owed a duty to the decedent to permit the patron to make the call or
97. Id. at 292, 240 N.W.2d at 222.
98. Id. at 288-89, 240 N.W.2d at 220-21.
99. Id. at 291, 240 N.W.2d at 222. "Farwell and Siegrist were companions on a so-
cial venture. Implicit in such a common undertaking is the understanding that one
will render assistance to the other when he is in peril if he can do so without endan-
gering himself." Id.
100. Id at 292, 240 N.W.2d at 222. The court went on to say that "Siegrist knew or
should have known" that Farwell needed medical attention and that "to say Siegrist
had no duty to obtain medical assistance or at least notify someone of Farwell's condi-
tion. . . would be 'shocking to humanitarian considerations' and fly in the face of 'the
commonly accepted code of social conduct.' '[Clourts will find a duty where, in gen-
eral, reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists.'" Id. at 291-92, 240
N.W.2d at 222 (footnotes omitted).
101. See, e.g., Soldano v. O'Daniels, 141 Cal. App. 3d 443, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1983).
102. Id. at 449, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
103. Id. at 452-53, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 317. See also Note, supra note 56, at 606.
104. 141 Cal. App. 3d. at 446, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
105. Id. at 447, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
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to call himself.10 6 Since there was no special relationship, the court
based this duty on the factors which the California Supreme Court
laid out in Rowland v. Christian:107
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defend-
ant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalance of insurance for the risk involved.1 0 8
Causation or misfeasance is not required to find liability in special
relationships, but is required between strangers. If the defendant did
not cause the injury, why should it matter whether or not he knew
the victim beforehand? If the answer is that the plaintiff, because of
the prior relationship, expects and relies upon the defendant to come
to his aid, certainly it is equally true that an individual in an emer-
gency situation would expect and rely upon a bystander, out of com-
mon humanity, to come to his aid.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
The public outcry that resulted from the news of the Kitty Geno-
vese case spurred psychological research in an effort to explain the
disturbing and baffling passivity of her neighbors.109 The controversy
surrounding the role of the law has centered around the desirability
of society's use of the law to encourage morality, instead of the effec-
tiveness of the law in encouraging morality.110 The issue yet to be
determined is whether the law can be instrumental in encouraging
people to exhibit more virtuous behavior.11
There is much skepticism as to the effectivness of religion in en-
couraging altruistic behavior towards one's neighbor. Indeed, one
particularly revealing study showed that seminary students, in a
hurry to deliver a speech on the topic of the Good Samaritan, ignored
106. Id. at 453, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
107. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). In this case, the California
Supreme Court eliminated the common law distinction between business invitees,
licensees and trespassers. The court balanced the reasonableness of the defendant's
behavior against the foreseeability of harm to the victim in its determination whether
or not a duty was owed. Id. at 118-19, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
108. Id. at 113, 443 P,2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. See also Soldano, 141 Cal. App.
3d at 451, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (applying the Rowland factors to the facts in that case).
109. L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 5.
110. Id. at 174.
111. Id.
a stranger en route who had collapsed on the ground.112 This exam-
ple merely emphasizes the possibility that society cannot rely on the
dictates of religion to sufficiently cope with the bystander dilemma.
As one commentator put it, "[Iln certain important respects, the fear
of the law is the beginning of virtue."'1 3 But is that true? What is
the potential of using the law to increase the incidence of morally de-
sirable behavior?
Studies indicate that "altruistic behavior is dictated by societal
norms.""i4 Individuals tend to act in accordance with the current
law. In another study,11 two groups of students were told that a
man was drowning about ten feet from where another man stood on
shore. The first group was informed that there was a law requiring
rescue and the second group was told that there was no such law.
Each group was told that the man on shore failed to act. In evaluat-
ing that man's inaction in terms of moral behavior, the first group
judged the man's failure to act more severely-"[b]reaking the law
was itself viewed as immoral. ... 116
In an experiment conducted by Clark and Wood,"i7 bystanders
were confronted with the situation of a maintenance man falling
from his ladder. In the first scenario he cried out for help, creating
an obvious emergency situaton. In the second scenario he remained
quiet, creating an ambiguous emergency situation. In the latter situa-
tion, fewer bystanders went to his aid. Clark and Wood concluded
that "whether the victim received help or not depended directly on
the level of ambiguity presented in the emergency situation."118 The
more ambiguous the situation, the less likely it was that a bystander
would take action.
Some of the most significant work done in the area of bystander
112. Darley & Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational and Dis-
positional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 100-08
(1973).
113. E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 190 (1955).
114. Note, supra note 71, at 556 (footnote omitted). "[I]ndividuals usually conform
to norms as recognized standards of behavior. One [reason] is the concern about the
reaction of others, since people often react adversely to 'abnormal' behavior." Id. at
556-57. Also, acting in accordance with norms reduces uncertainty. In an ambiguous
situation, people usually rely on norms instead of evaluating the particular situation.
Id. at 557. See also F. HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958).
115. See Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 58
n.51 (1972) (citing Kaufmann, Legality and Harmfulness of a Bystander's Failure to
Intervene as Determinants of Moral Judgments, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR:
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 77 (J.
Macauley & L. Berkowitz ed. 1970).
116. Franklin, supra note 115, at 58-59.
117. Clark & Wood, Why Don't Bystanders Help? Because of Ambiguity?, 24 J.
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 392-400 (1972).
118. Clark & Wood, Where is the Apathetic Bystander? Situational Characteristics
of the Emergency, 29 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 279, 285 (1974).
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response was conducted by Latan6 and Darley in the 1960's.1 9 What
has emerged from their research is a very disturbing dilemma involv-
ing crowd inertia: the presence of a crowd or group of bystanders at
the scene of an emergency, instead of encouraging the bystanders to
take action, has the opposite effect. The more people there are, the
less likely it is that any one of them will respond.120
This disturbing response is attributed to two concepts-the "dif-
fuson of responsibility" and the "diffusion of blame."'121 It is ex-
plained as follows:
If only one bystander is present in an emergency, he carries all the responsi-
bility; he will feel all the guilt for not acting; he will bear all of the blame that
accrues from non-intervention. If others are present, the onus of responsibil-
ity is diffused, and the finger of blame points less directly to any one person.
The individual may be more likely to resolve his conflict between intervening
and non-intervening in favor of the latter alternative.1 22
Each bystander is perceiving an emergency situation, but he is si-
multaneously observing a lack of response from the other bystanders.
The inaction of the others leads him to believe he has misinterpreted
the situation and that it must not be as serious as he first thought.
The bystander observes that others are not going to the aid of the vic-
tim, thus he concludes that it is inappropriate or unnecessary for him
to do so.123 "[Ilt is possible for a state of pluralistic ignorance to de-
velop, in which each bystander is led by the apparent lack of concern
of the others to interpret the situation as being less serious than he
would if alone." 1
24
What are the implications of this research? Since it is quite com-
mon that a, crowd will be present at the scene of an emergency, 125
this issue requires immediate attention. Much of the research done
to date indicates that the law can be used effectively to increase Good
Samaritan behavior.126 Is there a compelling reason why we should
119. See L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 12-13. Their research was precipitated by the
Genovese case and is based on the premise that people commonly act unselfishly, moti-
vated by goodwill. Id.
120. See id at 13 (citing B. LATANt & J. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER:
WHY DOESN'T HE HELP? (1970) [hereinafter THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER]).
121. Id. (citing generally THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER, supra note 120).
122. I& (quoting THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER, supra note 120, at 90).
123. Id (citing THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER, supra note 120, at 110).
124. Id. (quoting THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER, supra note 120, at 110 (emphasis
in original)).
125. See, e.g., Kiesel, supra note 1, at 1208-09. As the four men raped the young
woman, patrons watched and cheered and, according to the bartender, "bystanders
were afraid to call the police." Id. at 1209.
126. See Franklin, supra note 115, at 58. "From what experiments have taught us
about human behavior in rescue situations, we might well conclude that the legal re-
not use it as such? In the final analysis, society must decide whether
it is willing to use the resources at its disposal to promote the notion
of communal responsibility over individual self-interest.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE
The need for a public duty to rescue has been recognized by at
least a few state legislatures. Vermont was the first state to enact a
statutory duty to rescue when it enacted the Duty to Aid the Endan-
gered Act in 1967.127 Minnesota followed Vermont's example when it
enacted its Good Samaritan law in 1971.128 More recently, public out-
cry over the gang rape in New Bedford, Massachusetts 129 has spurred
passage of a similar legislative enactment in Rhode Island.130
These statutes are all similar in that they require affirmative con-
duct to assist another person in peril. However, the Rhode Island
statute is a narrower form of rescue legislation in that it applies only
to the reporting of any first degree sexual assault.131
Vermont's and Minnesota's statutes have much broader applica-
quirement of rescue would, in moments of hesitation, tip the balance toward the de-
sired action." Id (footnote omitted).
127. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). The statute reads as follows:
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to
himself or without interference with important duties owed to others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is
being provided by others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsec-
tion (a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts con-
stitute gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive
remuneration. Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law
with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts com-
mitted in the ordinary course of his practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be
fined not more than $100.00.
Id.
128. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1985). The statute provides in per-
tinent part:
(1) Duty to Assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows
that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to
the extent that he can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, give
reasonable assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may in-
clude obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical
personnel. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor.
Id.
129. See Kiesel, supra note 1.
130. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3.1 (Supp. 1984). The statute provides:
Duty to report sexual assault: Any person, other than the victim, who
knows or has reason to know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted
first degree sexual assault in [sic] taking place in his/her presence shall imme-
diately notify the state police or the police department of the city or town in
which said assault or attempted assault is taking place of said crime.
Id.
131. Id.
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tion. They are not limited to criminal activity but apply to all types
of emergencies. 13 2 Vermont requires that anyone who knows that
another is exposed to grave danger must render assistance, provided
he can do so without endangering himself.133 A person is not re-
quired to place himself in peril in order to try to rescue another. The
rescuer is granted civil immunity for the aid rendered unless his ac-
tions constituted gross negligence.34 The statute imposes a fine not
to exceed $100 for willful failure to act.135
The Minnesota statute applies only to bystanders at the scene of
the emergency.136 A bystander is required to reasonably assist any-
one exposed to serious physical injury.137 Reasonable assistance may
take the form of prompt notification to the authorities.138 The res-
cuer is exempted from civil liability unless he acted in a willful and
wanton or reckless manner.139 One who violates this statute is guilty
of a petty misdemeanor.140
The objective of this legislation is not to coerce the rescuer into ex-
posing himself to unreasonable danger for a stranger, but is rather to
encourage action on the part of the bystander so that if aid cannot be
rendered the rescuer will call for help. Despite this recent legislative
expansion of the duty to rescue, the future of such laws is unclear.
Progress toward a public rescue duty has been slow and has met with
reluctance. Despite all the attention that the issue has attracted,
only two states, Vermont and Minnesota, enforce a general public
duty to rescue.141
132. See supra notes 127 & 128.
133. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973).
134. Id. § 519(b).
135. Id. § 519(c).
136. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05(1) (West Supp. 1985).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 604.05(2). This subsection provides in pertinent part:
(2) General immunity from liability. Any person who, without compensa-
tion or the expectation of compensation renders emergency care, advice, or
assistance at the scene of an emergency or during transit to a location where
professional medical care can be rendered, is not liable for any civil damages
as a result of acts or omissions by that person in rendering the emergency
care, advice, or assistance unless that person acts in a willful and wanton or
reckless manner in providing the care, advice, or assistance. ...
140. Id. § 604.05(1).
141. See supra notes 127 & 128.
V. CONCLUSION
The law as it exists today in the area of duty to rescue is both con-
fusing and contradictory. The courts have devised various "special
relationship" exceptions to the duty to rescue rule. The proliferation
of these exceptions has not only threatened to swallow the rule itself
but has created a situation where it is no longer possible to determine
which relationships are "special" and which relationships are not.
Either the rule must be changed or the exceptions clarified.
Much of the psychological research done to date appears to indicate
that the law may be an effective resource in encouraging altruistic
behavior. Given what the research has uncovered concerning crowd
reaction in an emergency situation, the law may be a very necessary
tool to combat "crowd inertia" and the failure to aid phenomenon.
However, only two states have enacted a general public duty to
rescue.
The bystander issue is a critical one. It is a dilemma which not
only involves the particular bystander, but affects all of society. It fo-
cuses on the very essence of society in both the formation and reflec-
tion of mankind's true nature and general quality of life. The
importance of this issue is perhaps best demonstrated by a recent
press report, about a woman who was caught in a river current and
swept downstream. Three teenagers on their bicycles saw her and
while one went to get help, the other two rode along the river trying
to catch up with her. Eventually, they were able to wade into the
water and pull her onto the bank. One of the boys then discovered
that he had saved his own mother's life.142 This real life illustration
"serves to remind us that we can never know when we may be by-
standers and who our victim will be; or when we may be victims and
who our bystander will be."143
CLARE ELAINE RADCLIFFE
142. See L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 204 (citing Boy Races River, Saves Mom, L.A.
Times, June 5, 1978, at 1, col. 5).
143. See L. SHELEFF, supra note 12, at 204.
